Draft Text
DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER
Draft executive order and implementing regulation text. This is a model — not a final legal document — designed to show how existing statutory authority could be exercised.
For discussion purposes only. Not affiliated with any government entity.
The White House
Executive Order on Addressing the Threat Posed by Foreign-Adversary Connected Vehicles Entering the United States Through the Northern Border and Adjacent Countries
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, [PRESIDENT], President of the United States of America, find that:
Connected vehicles equipped with Vehicle Connectivity Systems (VCS) and Automated Driving System (ADS) technologies, manufactured by, or incorporating hardware and software designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the People's Republic of China (PRC), present an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
Such vehicles, which collect sensitive data about their operators, passengers, pedestrians, and the surrounding environment — including precise geolocation, biometric data, driving patterns, and real-time mapping of critical infrastructure — create attack surfaces that could be exploited by a foreign adversary for surveillance, data exfiltration, or remote disruption of transportation systems.
On January 16, 2026, the Government of Canada entered into an agreement with the PRC to reduce tariffs on PRC-origin electric vehicles from 100 percent to 6.1 percent and to permit the importation of up to 49,000 PRC-origin electric vehicles per year, increasing to 70,000 vehicles per year within five years. This action by a country sharing the longest land border with the United States — spanning approximately 5,525 miles with 119 ports of entry — creates an acute and immediate pathway for PRC-origin connected vehicles to reach United States roads through temporary cross-border entry by Canadian residents, circumventing all existing United States tariff and import restrictions.
PRC-domiciled manufacturers of connected electric vehicles are also establishing manufacturing, assembly, and distribution operations in Mexico for the purpose of circumventing existing tariffs and trade restrictions on PRC-origin vehicles and gaining access to the United States market through preferential treatment under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and Most Favored Nation tariff rates.
The magnitude of the PRC's state-directed subsidization of its electric vehicle industry — estimated at over $230 billion since 2009 — combined with demonstrated PRC state capacity and intent to use economic interdependence as a coercive tool, creates the conditions for rapid, irreversible damage to domestic automobile manufacturing capacity critical to the national defense.
The growing adoption of PRC-origin connected vehicles by residents of Canada — accelerated by the January 2026 Canada-PRC agreement — who routinely cross the northern land border of the United States for personal and commercial purposes, creates a distinct and immediate threat. Each such vehicle temporarily present on United States roads operates as a mobile sensor platform — equipped with cameras, LiDAR, radar, ultrasonic sensors, GPS receivers, and cellular connectivity — capable of high-resolution mapping of critical infrastructure, military installations, government facilities, and transportation networks in proximity to the northern border, including Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Fort Drum, and numerous defense industrial facilities. The temporary importation exemptions available under current customs law were not designed to address the entry of internet-connected surveillance-capable platforms controlled by a foreign adversary.
I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with this threat and order:
Section 1. Prohibition on Importation of Covered Vehicles.
(a) The importation into the United States of any covered vehicle, as defined in section 5 of this order, is hereby prohibited, regardless of the country from which such vehicle is exported or in which such vehicle was finally assembled.
(b) No United States person shall engage in any transaction related to the importation, distribution, sale, financing, leasing, or servicing of a covered vehicle within the United States.
(c) The prohibitions in subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect 90 days after the date of this order with respect to vehicles for which binding purchase orders were placed before the date of this order, and immediately for all other transactions.
Section 1A. Temporary Entry of Covered Vehicles by Nonresident Individuals.
(a) The temporary importation of a covered vehicle into the United States by a nonresident individual for personal use, including entry under a temporary importation under bond (TIB) or under any other customs exemption for temporary entry, is hereby prohibited, unless the individual complies with the conditions established under subsection (c) of this section.
(b) The prohibition in subsection (a) shall apply to all covered vehicles operated across the land borders of the United States, regardless of the duration of the intended stay, and regardless of whether the vehicle is operated for personal, commercial, or transit purposes.
(c) The Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall, within 60 days of the date of this order, promulgate regulations establishing a Temporary Entry with Connectivity Disable (TECD) procedure, under which a nonresident individual may temporarily bring a covered vehicle into the United States subject to the following conditions:
- (i) All cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, satellite, and other wireless communication capabilities of the vehicle shall be physically disabled by a CBP-certified technician at the port of entry, and a tamper-evident seal shall be applied to the vehicle's telematics control unit;
- (ii) The vehicle operator shall sign a declaration acknowledging the connectivity disable requirement and consenting to inspection of the tamper-evident seal upon departure;
- (iii) Temporary entry under TECD shall not exceed 72 hours per crossing, and the vehicle shall exit the United States through a port of entry equipped to verify the integrity of the tamper-evident seal;
- (iv) Violation of the TECD conditions — including tampering with or removing the connectivity disable seal, exceeding the 72-hour limitation, or exiting through a non-designated port — shall result in seizure of the vehicle and civil penalties as provided under IEEPA and applicable customs laws.
(d) The Commissioner may, by regulation, designate specific ports of entry as TECD-capable ports and may limit TECD processing to such ports based on available inspection capacity.
(e) Pending the promulgation of TECD regulations under subsection (c), no covered vehicle shall be permitted temporary entry into the United States under any authority.
Section 2. Implementation by the Secretary of Commerce.
(a) The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Bureau of Industry and Security, shall within 60 days of the date of this order publish in the Federal Register an initial list of covered entities — persons determined to be owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC government, the Chinese Communist Party, or the PRC's military-industrial complex, that are engaged in the design, development, manufacture, or supply of connected vehicles or connected vehicle systems.
(b) The Secretary of Commerce shall promulgate regulations implementing this order within 120 days, including:
- (i) criteria for determining whether a vehicle is a covered vehicle;
- (ii) a licensing procedure for narrow exceptions where the Secretary determines that a specific transaction does not pose a threat to national security;
- (iii) requirements for importers to certify the origin of all connected vehicle systems incorporated into vehicles presented for entry;
- (iv) penalties for violation, including civil penalties of up to $368,136 per violation and criminal penalties as provided under IEEPA.
(c) The Secretary of Commerce shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, to implement border enforcement of this order.
Section 3. Border Enforcement.
(a) The Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall issue guidance within 30 days of the date of this order requiring enhanced country-of-origin documentation for all electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles presented for entry at ports of entry on the northern and southern borders of the United States.
(b) The Commissioner shall apply the substantial transformation doctrine to determine the country of origin of electric vehicles, giving due weight to the origin of the vehicle's battery system, electric drivetrain, vehicle connectivity system, and automated driving system in making such determination.
(c) The Commissioner shall apply the rebuttable presumption under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117–78) to electric vehicle battery components and critical minerals where supply chain tracing indicates processing or manufacturing in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or by entities on the UFLPA Entity List.
Section 4. Investment Review.
(a) The Secretary of the Treasury, as Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), shall issue guidance designating the connected vehicle sector as a priority sector for CFIUS review.
(b) Any transaction involving a PRC person or entity and a United States business engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, servicing, or financing of connected vehicles or connected vehicle systems, or in the development or operation of electric vehicle charging infrastructure, shall be presumptively subject to mandatory CFIUS filing requirements.
Section 5. Definitions.
For purposes of this order:
(a) "Covered vehicle" means any motor vehicle that: (i) is manufactured by a covered entity; (ii) incorporates a Vehicle Connectivity System or Automated Driving System that is designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a covered entity; or (iii) incorporates a battery system in which more than 25 percent of the value of the battery cells was manufactured or assembled by a covered entity.
(b) "Covered entity" means any person that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC government, the Chinese Communist Party, any PRC provincial or local government, or any entity acting on behalf of or at the direction of the foregoing, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.
(c) "Connected vehicle" means a vehicle that integrates onboard networked hardware with automotive software systems to communicate via short-range or wide-area wireless connectivity with other vehicles, infrastructure, mobile devices, or cloud services.
(d) "Vehicle Connectivity System" and "Automated Driving System" have the meanings given those terms in 15 C.F.R. Part 7.
Section 6. Section 232 Investigation.
(a) The Secretary of Commerce shall, within 15 days of the date of this order, self-initiate an investigation under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862) to determine the effects on the national security of imports of electric vehicles and electric vehicle components, with particular attention to imports originating from or controlled by entities in the PRC.
(b) The investigation shall consider the cumulative effect of PRC state-directed subsidization, the circumvention of existing tariff measures through third-country assembly, the cybersecurity implications of connected vehicle technology, and the impact on domestic manufacturing capacity necessary for national defense.
Section 7. General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
[PRESIDENT]
THE WHITE HOUSE,
[Date]
Implementing Regulation
Draft Federal Register Notice
Accompanying the EO, the Bureau of Industry and Security would publish an interim final rule with request for comments (IFR) — a mechanism that allows the rule to take immediate effect while the comment period runs. Key provisions of the implementing regulation:
Covered Entity Identification
BIS would publish and maintain a Connected Vehicle Entities List — modeled on the Entity List (15 C.F.R. Part 744) — identifying specific PRC-nexus manufacturers, Tier 1 suppliers, and connected vehicle software developers. Initial entries would include BYD, CATL, Chery, SAIC, Great Wall Motor, NIO, Xpeng, Li Auto, Geely Auto, and their subsidiaries and affiliates. The list would be updated on a rolling basis.
25% Battery Cell Value Test
A vehicle triggers coverage if more than 25% of the value of its battery cells was manufactured or assembled by a covered entity. This threshold is deliberately set below the USMCA 75% regional value content requirement — ensuring that vehicles with significant PRC battery content are captured even if they otherwise qualify for USMCA preferential treatment.
Importer Certification Requirement
Every importer of an electric or hybrid vehicle would be required to submit a Connected Vehicle Origin Declaration (CVOD) at the time of entry, certifying the identity and national origin of the manufacturers of the vehicle's VCS, ADS, and battery system. False certification would be subject to IEEPA civil and criminal penalties and customs fraud penalties under 19 U.S.C. § 1592.
Licensing Regime
A specific license may be granted by BIS for transactions that would otherwise be prohibited, where the applicant demonstrates that the covered components have been fully replaced with non-covered alternatives, or that the security risks have been fully mitigated through technical means approved by BIS. The review standard would be a presumption of denial — consistent with Entity List licensing policy for PRC entities.
Coordination with Existing Rules
The IFR would be structured to complement, not replace, the existing BIS connected vehicles rule (15 C.F.R. Part 7). The EO prohibition would apply immediately; the existing BIS rule's MY2027 software and MY2030 hardware deadlines would continue to apply as the baseline for all vehicles, including those not otherwise covered by the EO.
Legal Durability
Where This Gets Challenged
Any executive action of this scope will face litigation. The most likely challenges and their prospects:
IEEPA Scope Challenge
Moderate RiskChallengers will argue IEEPA doesn't authorize import bans on consumer goods, or that the national emergency declaration is pretextual. Courts have given IEEPA broad deference. The Huawei/ZTE precedent is strong. The connected-vehicle security rationale is more credible than the fentanyl rationale used for 2025 Canada/Mexico tariffs. Risk: moderate, but the government likely prevails.
USMCA/WTO Challenge
Low RiskBoth USMCA (Article 32.2) and GATT (Article XXI) contain national security exceptions. The US takes the position that these exceptions are self-judging. The WTO Appellate Body is non-functional. Canada and Mexico could invoke USMCA dispute resolution, but the security exception provides substantial cover and the US has demonstrated willingness to weather such challenges.
Due Process / APA Challenge
Moderate RiskAffected importers and dealers may argue the EO's immediate prohibition denies due process. Mitigated by the 90-day transition for existing purchase orders, the licensing regime, and the IFR's comment period. The Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS precedent requires minimum process but does not require pre-deprivation hearings for national security actions.
Temporary Entry / Personal Vehicle Ban
High RiskBanning Canadian and Mexican citizens from driving their personal vehicles across the border is the most aggressive element of this proposal and the most likely to generate diplomatic backlash and litigation. Challengers will argue it exceeds IEEPA authority (which targets "transactions," not personal travel), violates the right to travel, and is disproportionate. The TECD compromise (connectivity disable + 72-hour limit) mitigates the legal risk by allowing entry under conditions rather than imposing an absolute ban — framing it as a security inspection analogous to agricultural or hazmat checks, not a travel restriction. CBP already has broad authority to condition vehicle entry on compliance with US law. Still, this will be politically and legally the hardest piece to defend.